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Abstract 
The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist 
and scientist are unique. In a series of experiments, Knobe, 
Prasada, and Newman (2013) show that these terms allow 
two independent criteria for categorisation, one of which 
is inherently normative. This paper presents and tests a 
novel account of the content of these ‘dual character 
concepts’. We argue that the normative dimension of dual 
character concepts represents commitments to fulfill certain 
idealized functions. We then present evidence that the 
normative dimension is a central dimension in the 
conceptual structure of dual character concepts. Finally, 
we show that our account is both descriptively and 
explanatorily adequate.  
Keywords: dual character concepts; social cognition; social 
role concepts. 
 
1 Introduction 
In a recent paper, Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) 
present a series of original experiments designed to show 
that the concepts expressed by terms such as artist and 
scientist have two independent criteria for categorization, 
one of which is inherently normative. They call this unique 
class of concepts ‘dual character concepts’ (DCCs). The 
present work presents and defends an account of the content 
of DCCs. To illustrate the basic properties of DCCs 
consider the following scenarios. John has two biological 
children. He materially provides them with all their needs, 
including food, proper schooling, and some nice toys. 
However, John does not think doing so is his duty; in fact, 
he is only a good father because he thinks that his behavior 
will advance his career as a politician. Is John really a 
father? In response, consider whether you agree with (1-a) 
and (1-b): 
 
(1)  a. There is a sense in which John is clearly a father.  
 b. However, if you think about what it really means  
to be a father, you would have to say that John is not 
a true father after all. 
 
Now, imagine that John’s career foundered and that he 
abandoned his two kids. Fortunately, John’s brother, Mark, 
who has no biological children, decided to care for the kids. 
Mark is not as materially successful as John. Often he can’t 
provide the kids with some of their needs. Still, Mark really 
loves the kids and works very hard to make sure they have 
everything they need. Is Mark really a father? In response, 
consider whether you agree with (2-a) and (2-b): 
 
 
(2)  a. There is a sense in which Mark is clearly not a 
father.   
 b. However, if you think about what it really means 
to be a father, you would have to say that Mark is a 
true father after all 
 
The experiments presented by Knobe et al. (2013) suggest 
that most of us would accept these statements, and that this 
basic pattern generalizes to other social role terms such as 
artist and scientist. Now, not all social roles are equally 
acceptable in this basic dual pattern scenario. In particular, 
terms such as doorman and welder obtain lower 
acceptability ratings in cases parallel to (1-b) and (2-b).  
Knobe et al. argue that to explain these acceptability 
patterns, we need to assume that DCCs have a unique 
internal structure. They agree with the traditional view that 
we often use concrete or salient features to categorize objects, 
even when we know that some entities might (i) have these 
features and not fall under the category, or (ii) lack these 
features and still fall under the category (Lakoff, 1973; 
Gelman, 2003). For example, we know that some substance 
might look exactly like gold and not be gold, and that some 
animal that lacks the typical tiger coat might still be a tiger. 
But what distinguishes, in the first instance, DCCs from 
other kinds of lexical concepts is that DCCs include a 
normative dimension on which modifiers such as true 
operate.  
What is the content of the normative dimension? The 
experiments of Knobe et al. partially address that question, 
but a full answer requires additional refinements and 
experimental tests. In what follows, we present an account of 
DCCs that explicitly addresses this question. Specifically, 
we will test and defend the following hypotheses: (i) the 
normative dimension represents the commitment to fulfil the 
idealized functions associated with DCCs, and (ii) this 
dimension is central to DCCs. On this view, someone 
counts as a true father not because he actually fulfills the 
idealized function of a father, but because he is committed to 
doing so, even if he happens to fail. In addition, this 
commitment is a central dimension of the category of 
fathers, i.e., it is a dimension which explains the inclusion 
of other concrete features associated with fathers.  
In §2 we present a preliminary study used to generate 
stimuli for our experiments. In §3 we present and in §4 we 
test our account. In §5 we argue that our theory of DCCs is  
explanatorily adequate.  
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2 Preliminary Study 
Our study of DCCs focuses on social role terms such as 
firefighter, bartender, and scientist. Broadly speaking, 
these terms pick out professional social roles. Knobe, 
Prasada, and Newman (2013) argue that one way to 
determine whether a term expresses a DCC is to consider its 
acceptability under true-modification. By ‘true-
modification’ we mean sentences of the form of (3), i.e., in 
which the predicate is modified by true: 
 (3) Jack is a true scientist. 
 
The basic idea is that, in this kind of linguistic 
construction, the true-modifier operates on the normative 
dimension. Scientist is a paradigmatic DCC, hence (3) 
seems perfectly acceptable. For terms that arguably have 
either no normative dimension or no default value on it, 
true-modifications will seem less acceptable, as in (4):  
 (4) Jack is a true cashier. 
 
As this example illustrates, not all social role terms are 
equally acceptable under true-modification. Whether this 
means that only some social role terms are really DCCs—as 
Knobe et al. (2013) and Leslie (2014) seem to think—is an 
issue that we shall discuss later. For now, let us simply call 
social role terms which receive low acceptability ratings in 
true-modifications ‘weak DCCs’ and those which receive 
high-acceptability ratings ‘strong DCCs’. Although we 
should distinguish between weak and strong DCCs, it is 
also important to note that DCCs are highly context 
sensitive (Leslie 2014). More precisely: adding a context 
can increase the acceptability ratings of true-modifications 
involving social role terms that, in other conditions, receive 
low ratings. This suggests that one way of investigating the 
content of DCCs is to examine the interaction between 
contextual parameters and shifts in the acceptability of weak 
and strong DCCs in true-modifications. We follow this 
strategy in Study 1. Given this aim, we need a set of 
stimuli that allows us to trace and compare the behavior of 
weak and strong DCCs. The aim of the following 
preliminary study is to generate such a set. All subjects who 
participated in our experiments were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system for human intelligence 
tasks.  
Method 
276 subjects participated in this preliminary study. Each 
participant received a single question of the form Jack is a 
true x without any context. Following Knobe et al. (2013)’s 
measure, participants were then asked to rate how 
natural/weird this sentence sounded on a 7-point Likert scale 
from ‘1’ meaning ‘sounds weird’ to ‘7’ meaning ‘sounds 
natural’. We used all the professional-role concepts that in 
Knobe et al. (2013)’s original study were classified as either 
DCCs or controls.  
Results and Discussion 
The average ratings for each individual concept are shown in 
Figure 1. The mean rating for those concepts that Knobe et 
al. classified as DCCs is 5.52 (SE = .16) and for controls is 
4.71 (SE = .15). An independent t-test was performed, 
t(256) = 3.743; p < .001, indicating that the difference 
between DCCs and social role controls is highly significant. 
 
 
Figure 1: Acceptability-ratings for true-modifications of 18 
social role concepts. 
 
This preliminary study replicates a key result of Knobe et 
al. (2013). When judging the acceptability of true-modifi-
cations, the mean rating for DCCs such as artist is 
significantly higher than the mean rating for the social role 
controls such as doorman. At the same time, if we list the 
individual ratings, as in Figure 1, we can see that there is a 
smooth transition between the acceptability ratings of the 
highest and lowest rated DCCs. This suggests that we 
should talk instead of strong and weak DCCs. To examine 
and compare the effect of context on the ratings of DCCs in 
our subsequent experiment, we used a median split dividing 
the concepts into strong and weak DCCs. 
 
3 The normative dimension of DCCs 
What is the content of the normative dimension of DCCs? 
When we say that the concept expressed by scientist 
includes a ‘normative component’ and not only a set of 
concrete features, what exactly are we claiming is 
represented? Knobe et al. (2013) raise some key points. 
First, this dimension has to do with abstract values. What 
they mean by this is revealed in their examples: for scientist 
the abstract value is something like the quest for impartial 
truths and explanations. Second, the normative dimension 
of a class must be distinguished from its typical function. 
The normative dimension seems to directly interact with 
modifiers such as true but not directly with modifiers such 
as good, taken in the sense of ‘useful or efficient’ (see Knobe 
et al. (2013)’s experiment 1). In the intended reading, a 
good calculator is an artifact that is good for its function; 
similarly for social roles such as efficient or skillful 
scientist. However, we can imagine scenarios in which 
someone can be a true scientist without being, yet, a skillful 
scientist. We can also imagine scenarios in which someone 
can be a skillful scientist without, ultimately, being a true 
scientist (see study 1 in §4.1). Since, in the intended 
reading, the acceptability of good/skillful vs. true scientist 
can dissociate, it seems clear that the normative dimension 
does not directly represent the typical function of the class. 
Knobe et al. (2013) do not commit to a more specific 
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claim about the content of the normative dimension; but 
building on their results, Leslie (2014) makes a concrete 
proposal. Leslie agrees that the normative dimension of 
DCCs does not represent their typical function, but she 
argues that it represents something that is closely related, 
namely, their ‘ideal function’. On this view, we can say that 
a scientist that completely resists empirical demands to 
modify or abandon his theory is not a true scientist because 
he is not satisfying the ideal function of a scientist, which is 
something like building theories that are responsive to 
empirical evidence, among other things. Leslie’s proposal 
can be implemented in different ways. One way is to assume 
that the idealized function is represented directly. On this 
view, the normative dimension of scientist would represent 
something like the search for empirically constrained truths 
and theories. However, this is not the best way to 
implement Leslie’s proposal. For it is in tension with the 
basic observation, mentioned above, according to which 
someone who tries hard but often fails to embody the ideal 
function of a father or scientist can still count as a true father 
or scientist. Study 1 below confirms this basic intuition. 
A better way to implement Leslie’s proposal, in our 
view, is to hold that what really counts to satisfy the 
normative dimension is not so much whether someone 
actually fulfills the idealized function to some non-trivial 
degree, but rather whether someone is committed to fulfill 
the idealized function. Consider an example of non-
professional or not yet skillful scientist, Jim. On this view, 
we can still say that Jim is a true scientist as long as he is 
clearly committed to the ideals of producing theories and 
views that are responsive to evidence. So according to this 
account, there are many contexts in which someone who 
fails as a scientist nevertheless counts as a true scientist, as 
long as s/he has the required commitments. 
Our hypothesis then is that we can dissociate the 
property of actually fulfilling the idealized function from that 
being committed to fulfill the idealized function, and that 
what ultimately matters for satisfying the normative 
dimension is the commitment. Study 1 below tests and 
supports this view of the relation between commitments, 
idealized functions and the content of the normative 
dimension of DCCs. To be clear, our claim is not that 
evidence that an entity fulfills the idealized function does not 
matter for satisfying the normative dimension of DCCs. 
After all, that someone is a really an efficient or skillful 
scientist is often a reliable sign that s/he is committed to 
being a scientist. Our claim is that, when pitted against each 
other, being committed to fulfill the idealized function is 
more important for satisfying the normative dimension of 
DCCs than simply being able to fulfill that function. 
 
4 Experimental Studies 
4.1 Study 1 
We have argued that the normative dimension does not 
directly represent typical or ideal functions, but rather 
represents these as the objects of commitments. What is the 
evidence for this? The vignettes used by Knobe et al. (2013) 
in their Experiment 2 (the most relevant for our purposes) 
do not assert that the relevant individuals are good or 
skillful at their role; hence they cannot be used to support 
the alleged dissociation between the functional and the 
normative dimensions. To directly test the hypothesis that 
what matters for the normative dimension is not whether 
one is skilled or efficient, but rather whether one is 
committed, we presented subjects with ‘high-function’ and 
‘high-devotion’ contexts and compared their effects on the 
acceptability of true-modifications. The high-function 
context highlights Jack’s high skill as an x. We were 
particularly interested to see whether an explicit high-
function context would increase the acceptability ratings of 
true-modifications of weak DCCs. The high-devotion 
context highlights Jack’s high devotion to being an x. If our 
view is correct, the high-devotion context should have a 
stronger and more positive impact on the acceptability of 
true-modifications than the high-function context. 
Method 
We used the 18 social role concepts tested in the 
preliminary study. Based on those results, we did a median 
split, dividing them into weak DCCs (caseworker, 
doorman, cashier, waiter, tailor, teacher, minister, 
optician, bartender) and strong DCCs (baker, welder, 
firefighter, scientist, artist, mechanic, comedian, musician, 
soldier ). To examine how high-function (HF) and high-
devotion (HD) contexts interact with the normative 
dimension, we presented 271 subjects with HF contexts and 
a different group of 294 subjects with HD contexts. The 
respective contexts read as follows: 
 (HF) Jack is an artist/doorman. He is really skilled 
and highly efficient at his job. 
 (HD) Jack is an artist/doorman. He really likes his 
job and is completely devoted to it. 
 
After being presented with a HF or HD context, participants 
were then asked to rate whether the sentence Jack is a true 
artist/doorman sounded weird (1), natural (7), or anything 
in between. We computed the mean values of people’s 
responses given HF and HD contexts, and compared them 
with the mean values in the no-context condition (see 
preliminary study).  
 
 
Figure 2: Acceptability-ratings for strong and weak DCCs in 
the no-context condition (left), in the high function context 
(middle), and in the high devotion context (right). 
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Results 
The average ratings for strong and weak DCCs in all three 
conditions are shown in Figure 2. We applied a 3 x 2 
ANOVA with participants' ratings as the dependent measure 
and the independent factors Context with three levels (no-
context, HF, HD) and Concept (strong DCCs, weak DCCs). 
The analysis reveals highly significant main effects of both 
Context, F(2; 835) = 10.571; p < 0.001, and Concept, 
F(835) = 46.227; p < 0.001. For all 18 social role concepts, 
the HD context raises the mean value from 5.04 (no-context) 
to 5.37 (SE = 0.10), whereas the HF context decreases the 
value to 4.68 (SE = 0.11). Moreover, a highly significant 
interaction occurs between Context and Concept, F(2; 835) 
= 4.807; p = 0.008. For strong DCCs, the HF context 
decreases the participants' ratings from 5.74 to 5.04, while 
the HD context has no effect on people's ratings. In contrast, 
for weak DCCs, the HF context has no effect, whereas the 
HD context strongly increases their average value from 4.38 
(no-context) to 5.15. 
Discussion 
The comparative influence of high-function and high-
devotion contexts on strong and weak DCCs strongly 
supports our hypothesis that the normative dimension of 
DCCs represents the commitments to fulfill the relevant 
function. Paradigmatic representatives of strong DCCs are 
terms such as scientist and artist. Recall that, as established 
in our preliminary study, strong DCCs are those DCCs that 
already obtain high acceptability ratings under true-
modification in the no-context condition. In other words, 
knowing that some random Jack is a scientist suggests to 
participants, even without further information, that Jack is 
likely also committed to the role of a scientist. In contrast, 
weak DCCs such as doorman and cashier are those DCCs 
that obtained lower ratings in the no context condition. In 
other words, merely knowing that Jack is a cashier does not 
suggest to participants, to the same degree as with strong 
DCCs, that Jack satisfies the respective commitments. 
Unsurprisingly, then, a high-devotion context is less 
informative, and hence has almost no effect, on the 
acceptability ratings of strong DCCs. Crucially, however, a 
high-devotion context basically turns weak DCCs into 
strong DCCs. 
Our results also show that high function contexts 
decrease the acceptability of true-modifications. This further 
supports the view that the normative dimension of DCCs 
does not directly represent the typical functions. In 
particular, even though weak DCCs have space to increase 
their ratings under true-modification, high function contexts 
did not increase their acceptability. To illustrate, knowing 
that Jack is a skilled waiter does not increase the 
acceptability of the claim that Jack is a true waiter. What 
about the negative effect of high function contexts on the 
acceptability ratings of strong DCCs? This is probably due 
to pragmatic effects. Asserting that Jack is a skilled artist 
can plausibly be taken as evidence that he is at most only a 
skilled artist, hence that he lacks something which is 
relevant to his being a true artist. Overall, Study 1 shows 
that a high devotion context increases the acceptability of 
true-modifications for weak DCCs. In addition, high 
function contexts have a negative influence on strong DCCs, 
and a lack of effect on the acceptability of weak DCCs. 
Together, these results support the hypothesis that the 
normative dimension of DCCs represents commitments to 
fulfill the function of social roles. 
 
4.2 Study 2 
This study was designed to directly compare the idealized 
function and the commitment dimensions represented by 
DCCs. Instead of investigating social role concepts under 
true-modifications, we wanted to compare, in terms of their 
corresponding centrality, the function and the commitment 
to the function in the structure of DCCs. To do this, we had 
to select a measure of conceptual centrality. Sloman et al. 
(1998) show that there is a direct correlation between the 
centrality and the immutability of features. The 
immutability of a feature or dimension reflects how much 
the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature or 
dimension. The basic idea is simple. The centrality of a 
feature in a conceptual representation C reflects the degree to 
which other features in C depend on it, i.e., the degree to 
which it lends conceptual coherence. This means that it 
should be easier to mentally transform a non-central 
compared to a central feature of C. For example, it should be 
easier to think of a gun that is neither black nor made of 
steel, than to think of a gun that is not made to shoot. This 
is what we mean by the `mutability' of a feature. As our 
measure of mutability, hence of conceptual centrality, we 
chose a paradigm introduced by Sloman et al. (1998), called 
`surprise'. In this paradigm, experimenters ask participants 
to rate how surprised they would be to encounter an instance 
of the category that does not have some feature. The basic 
idea is that `instances missing mutable features should be 
less surprising than instances missing immutable features on 
the assumption that surprise is related to the difficulty of 
adapting an object representation to a concept. Adaptation 
should be easy if the object is missing a mutable feature but 
hard if it is missing an immutable feature' (Sloman et al., 
1998) 
Method 
117 subjects took part in experiment 3. Each participant was 
asked to evaluate one question that was randomly selected 
from the following two categories: (1) Commitment to fulfill 
Idealized Function, e.g. How surprised would you be to 
encounter an artist who does not care about creating 
inspiring works of art?; (2) Idealised Function, e.g. How 
surprised would you be to encounter an artist who does not 
create inspiring works of art? Subjects were asked to answer 
the question on a 7 point Likert scale from 1 = ‘not at all 
surprised' to 7 = `very surprised'. We investigated the social 
role concepts artist, musician, scientist. 
Results 
We compared the mean values between both conditions, i.e. 
we were interested in whether there is a significant difference 
between the commitment to fulfill an idealized function and 
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the idealized function itself. An independent t-test resulted 
in a significant result t(115) = 2.164; p = 0.003. The mean 
values are shown in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison between average ratings for how 
surprised people would be if they encountered a person who 
(1) is not committed (Commitment) to carrying out her / his 
social role vs. (2) a person who does not fulfill the idealized 
function of her / his social role (Idealized Function). 
Discussion 
Figure 3 compares the centrality ratings for the normative 
dimension (i.e. the commitment to fulfill the idealized 
function) and the function dimension (i.e., the function 
itself)). Crucially, the normative dimension is significantly 
less mutable, hence more central, than the representation of 
the function. To illustrate, this means that although actually 
producing empirically informed theories is a central feature 
of the concept associated with scientist, the commitment to 
produce such theories is an even more central feature. In 
addition, the result that although not an essence, the 
normative dimension is a central dimension of DCCs has a 
very important consequence for a particular foundational 
challenge that could be raised against DCCs. Some theorists 
might accept that the normative dimension is associated 
with the concepts expressed by social role terms such as 
scientist and artist, but insist that, properly speaking, it is 
not part of their conceptual structure. If this was the case, the 
normative dimension should be highly mutable, which is 
inconsistent with the results of this experiment. For Study 2 
shows that the normative dimension is an integral part, and 
possibly one of the most central parts, of the conceptual 
structures of certain social role concepts. 
 
5. General Discussion 
We have argued that the content of the normative 
dimension represents commitments to fulfill certain 
idealized functions. So the structure of DCCs includes, at 
least, the following dimensions: perceptual (how typical 
scientists look), functional (function of scientists), and 
normative (commitment to perform a certain function). 
Furthermore, the normative dimension seems to be, in the 
case of strong DCCs, a relatively central and immutable 
dimension.  
Knobe et al. (2013) raise an important challenge to any 
theory of DCCs. We have argued that the lexical concepts 
expressed by words such as scientist are DCCs with a 
normative dimension. The precise content of the normative 
dimension was postulated to explain the linguistic behavior 
of the corresponding nouns. Assuming our account explains 
the relevant data, we can say that it is ‘descriptively 
adequate’. However, why should there be a normative 
dimension in the conceptual structure of DCCs at all? In 
particular, why should social roles, but not other types of 
concepts, have a normative dimension? If we want our 
account of DCCs to also meet the demands of ‘explanatory 
adequacy’, we have to confront these questions. We have to 
explain why, given the basic function of concepts and 
categorization in cognition, and given the (metaphysical) 
properties of classes such as social roles, it should turn out 
that the normative is part of the conceptual structure of 
concepts such as scientist and artist.  
Following Rosch (1999), we assume that the formation 
of prototypes is guided by two basic principles of 
categorization, one having to do with the function of a 
conceptual system, and the other with the metaphysical 
structure of the perceived world: 
Cognitive economy. The goal of our conceptual system 
is to provide maximum information about the 
environment with the least cognitive effort. It is to an 
organism’s advantage to have as many properties as 
possible predictable from knowing any one property. 
Perceived world structure. The perceived world is not 
an unstructured set of equiprobable co-occurring features. 
Rather, objects and events in the world are perceived as 
having high-correlational structure. 
To see how these principles interact in concept formation, 
consider an example. Suppose you interact with objects y 
and z. How will they behave in possible future scenarios? 
To answer this question, you need to categorize y and z. 
Suppose y and z are golden yellow, but that y is static 
whereas z moves in all sorts of elaborate ways. At some 
point, you conclude that y is a gold ring and z is a bee. You 
can then make many predictions about their behavior, 
within a range that is useful for most ordinary purposes. 
Now, the behavior of the bee is much more complicated, 
and you might have to use some form of means-ends 
reasoning. Still, for most ordinary purposes, the repertoire of 
basic goals which we use to interact with a random bee---
e.g., that it wants pollen and will protect the hive---is based 
on its kind and context. For some purposes, we might 
subdivide the kinds of bees, and this will determine a more 
refined set of functions, but even in this case there is clearly 
no use in representing bees in terms of the normative 
dimension, i.e., in terms of their ‘commitments’.  
However, to add flexible social entities such as humans 
onto the perceived environment is to add a key layer of 
complexity. The behavior of humans is, given the demands 
of everyday life, radically unpredictable from the sorts of 
general biological facts we use to understand other animals. 
To predict human behavior in any useful way, one needs to 
know more than just the general biological kinds under 
which they fall and certain facts of the environment. In 
particular, one needs to know their social roles and the 
functions of those roles. Furthermore, one key property of 
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social roles is that, within certain parameters, they are often 
voluntary. Since Jack can choose to be a salesman or 
scientist, and since Jack can also choose to change roles, it 
is useful to categorize Jack in terms of his commitments.  
To generalize: human behavior is such that knowing their 
commitments is fundamental to make useful categorizations 
and predictions. In particular, it is useful to know not only 
whether Jack is good or bad at something, but also whether 
he is committed to it. Suppose you know that Jack is a 
really good pianist. Will he become a professional pianist? 
Hard to say. Suppose that you know, in addition, that Jack 
is committed to being a pianist. Then predicting his future 
behavior is easier. Suppose, on the other hand, that John is 
not a particularly good pianist. Will he become a 
professional pianist? Unlikely, but still hard to say. 
Suppose you find out that he is committed to being a 
pianist. You can predict, with some confidence, that he will 
keep playing, despite his current level.  
Almost everyone is, at some point in their development, 
quite bad at performing the functions of their future social 
roles; however, whether they will eventually perform those 
functions, and whether they will become good at them, 
depends to a large extent on their commitments. That social 
role concepts encode the function and normative dimensions 
allows us, in various contexts, to make entirely different 
predictions, crucial to determine how someone will behave 
in certain conditions. Hence, despite the high-level talk of 
`abstract values' and `normative dimensions', there is 
nothing mysterious about why, given the basic function of 
categorization and certain basic properties of the flexibility of 
human behavior, many of our social role concepts should 
include a dimension that encodes the relevant commitments. 
Without this dimension, our predictions regarding the 
behavior of others would be substantially impoverished.  
This account of the explanatory adequacy of our theory of 
DCCs explains why there are weak and strong DCCs. In our 
view, DCCs capture certain aspects of the basic structure of 
the perceived human social world, including sets of co-
occurring features. Now it is widely believed---often 
correctly---that membership in some social roles requires a 
greater degree of commitment and effort than membership in 
others. Cognitive Economy and Perceive World Structure 
entail that social role concepts should trace these differences. 
If we compare the weak (e.g., doorman) and strong DCCs 
(e.g., scientist), we can easily see that their orderings (see 
Figure 1 above) reflects a common cultural valuation along 
those lines. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that various social role concepts are dual 
character concepts (DCCs), and others are either weak or can 
be easily coerced into DCCs. We defended an account of the 
normative dimension of DCCs according to which this 
dimension represents commitments to fulfill the idealized 
function of a certain social role. We also showed that this 
dimension is central to their conceptual structure. 
Judgments involving social role concepts such as artist, 
scientist and friend are an essential part of social cognition, 
hence we expect that our account of the content of DCCs 
will have implications for theories of everyday social 
categorization and judgments. 
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